Keep your systems (vCenter Server, ESXi hosts, VMware Tools etc.) up to date when there are security patches released.When we at Truesec perform security health checks of customer vSphere environments, we always give everyone the following fundamental recommendations, so do make sure you have these in place: They also have some good videos covering the basics of vSphere ESXi security here:
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VMware has a good technical post about this ransomware at Deconstructing Defray777 Ransomware, which goes through the technical details, but doesn't mention specifically how to protect the ESXi hosts. Reverse engineering of the RansomEXX/Defray777 ESXi ransomware, displaying the strings found. As long as the host is still running, the ransomware monitors the virtual machines and will encrypt any new vmdk or other virtual machine files that are put on shared datastores that it can reach. However, they will usually not survive a reboot, and will need a complete reinstallation. It will also encrypt the ESXi host itself including all log files, so unless you have central tamper-proof logging in place it will be very difficult to secure forensic evidence regarding how the attack was carried out.ĭespite the encryption, the ESXi hosts will remain running since they have already loaded the system files into memory. The ransomware will encrypt all virtual machines' vmdk files on all attached datastores. Screenshot of ESXi virtual machine files encrypted by RansomEXX/Defray777 A future blog post will analyze this in more detail and provide more suggested protections. This could for example be done through an RCE vulnerability such as the one for SLP in ESXi or through Active Directory->vCenter Server->ESXi, but also in other ways. This blog post won't go into the technical details on how the attacker gets into the ESXi hosts to execute the actual ransomware. This can greatly increase the scope and speed of the attack, which is bad news for us. The benefit of this method from the attackers' side is that they can encrypt numerous systems without having to reach them all over the network and obtain administrative privileges. We have recently seen an increase in ransomware attacks where the encryption is executed from the virtualization platform (ESXi or Hyper-V hosts) rather than from inside each guest operating systems (Windows, Linux etc). We can fairly easily prevent this by combining the use of TPM 2.0, UEFI Secure Boot for the ESXi hosts and the relatively unknown ESXi setting, which is described in the 'Three steps to protect ESXi against ransomware' section below.This attack vector is possible because once attackers get control of an ESXi host, they can upload and execute any custom binaries they want.More info can be found in this Crowdstrike writeup. We have recently seen an increase in ransomware targeting VMware vSphere ESXi hosts and encrypting all virtual machines at once, quickly and effectively.These disks are not used as a scratch partition by default because they are seen as remote.Using TPM 2.0, Secure Boot and execInstalledOnly SATA disks are considered remote, not local.
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